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Intellectual Property Equality 
Margaret Chon1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Three hundred years ago, the first major Anglo-American copyright 
statute, often referred to as the Statute of Anne, went into effect.2  Copyright 
scholars have been and will be commemorating this occasion throughout 
this calendar year, although one could argue that our celebration may have 
inadvertently frozen the origin story of copyright.3 A slightly different 
critique is that while we commonly refer to this act as the “Statute of 
Anne,” it was more precisely entitled: An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.4  I suppose 
we can forgive ourselves for almost always referring to the Statute of Anne 
by its abbreviated form, but we should not forget that this act wrested 
control of books from the bookbinders, booksellers, and printers (or the 
“Company of Stationers,” as they were then called). The Statute of Anne 
destroyed their prior monopolies by limiting the term of copyright to 
fourteen years for books not yet published, twenty-eight years total if the 
author renewed for an additional fourteen-year term, and twenty-one years 
for books already in print.5 
At first glance, the links between the origins of copyright in the United 
Kingdom and the origins of equality norms in the United States seem 
tenuous. One ambiguous connector is Thomas Jefferson who, as our first 
secretary of state. was also one of the first three administrators of the Patent 
Act of 1790.6 As everyone familiar with U.S. history surely knows, 
Jefferson, a slaveholder who would not free his slaves, referred to equality 
as a fundamental value of the as-yet incipient republic, stating that: “all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”7 Jefferson was not involved in drafting the Constitution, as he 
had been elected by the Continental Congress to be a diplomat to France 
while the Constitutional Convention was convened.8 According to at least 
one biographer, he was so devoted to technology transfer (as we call it now) 
that during his travels throughout Europe during this time, he smuggled a 
sack of rice out of Lombardy, Italy, despite the fact that there was a penalty 
of death for anyone caught taking this particular variety of rice out of the 
country.9 And there is correspondence between Jefferson and James 
Madison suggesting that Jefferson was ambivalent about “the benefit even 
of limited monopolies”10 of intellectual property at the time our Constitution 
was drafted—a Constitution that did include a copyright and patent clause, 
but did not include, at least not at first, an equal protection clause.11  
Intellectual property and equality: these two areas are often not 
mentioned in the same paragraph, much less the same sentence. Both fields, 
like most areas of law, are rife with legal fictions, social constructions, and 
historical accidents carrying with them material consequences to real people 
within imagined communities. They have different discourses and epistemic 
pedigrees. Nonetheless, I have come to view these separate scholarly 
inquiries as one, in what I now call intellectual property equality. 
The better public policy choices in intellectual property should always 
keep at the forefront the optimal distribution and not just the absolute 
amount of knowledge (or “learning” in the vernacular of Anne). What 
intellectual property law does—what the Statute of Anne did, for 
example—is to create an artificial scarcity in the form of an exclusive right. 
Prior to the Statute of Anne, the Crown had used its prerogative—its royal 
power, its printing patents or privileges, and its stationers’ copyright—to 
control the directions of knowledge in ways that were top-down, 
hierarchical, nontransparent, ad hoc, and predictably, distributionally 
unequal.12  The government also repressed religious dissent by providing 
licenses to print only the kinds of books that the Crown deemed suitable.13 
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We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Statute of Anne, passed by 
Parliament against these abuses, was a model for our own U.S. 
constitutional copyright clause and subsequent statutes.14 An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning created a temporary artificial scarcity and thus 
a public domain of knowledge once the time for exclusive rights expired 
after fourteen, twenty-one, or twenty-eight-year terms.15 When the Statute 
of Anne went into effect, copyright (through carefully limited terms) was 
redesigned so as to promote the diffusion of knowledge. 
As others have persuasively argued, the constitutional copyright and 
patent power of Congress is intimately intertwined with the free speech and 
expression clauses of our First Amendment, which provide a powerful basis 
for access to learning and knowledge, balanced against the exclusionary 
rights of intellectual property.16 However, the kind of freedom represented 
by equality—the freedom of human flourishing through access to education, 
for example—has been underexplored in intellectual property literature 
when compared to the freedoms of expression and speech.  And it goes 
without saying that the converse is true as well—intellectual property and 
its normative commitment towards knowledge diffusion has been 
underrepresented in the equality literature.  
While equality jurisprudence has focused on the development of 
antidiscrimination norms outside of intellectual property, one enormous 
area of inequality has been the realm of knowledge, whether at basic levels 
or in areas of advanced scientific research and development. Can copyright, 
which is the primary focus of this essay, be leveraged through equality 
norms to further encourage its goal of learning?  I claim here that the 
copyright and patent clause bears an intimate relationship to the equality 
values in our constitutional tradition, despite the fact that these sections of 
the Constitution were not contemporaneously drafted. The regulation of 
knowledge can be calibrated as well to equality norms developed in other 
contexts, such as human development and sustainable development, which 
262 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
INFLUENTIAL VOICES 
are increasingly prominent in global governance regimes.  My argument 
will begin with development and proceed to equality. 
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRAMED BY DEVELOPMENT 
Knowledge governance through intellectual property is now being 
framed more and more by the concept of development, whatever that is—
mostly a floating signifier, conveniently left abstract so that people believe 
that they agree about it. One of its eloquent academic deconstructionists 
describes it as “a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts 
societies, and a fantasy which unleashes passions.”17 Nonetheless, it is one 
of the main conceptual vessels deployed to address asymmetry within the 
global trade system and other legal regimes.  
The grand experiment of this development age of intellectual property is 
whether the norms of intellectual property will result in outcomes 
addressing issues relevant to the so-called bottom billion18 of the world’s 
6.8 billion and growing population. The major intellectual property legal 
regimes are now tasked with implementing development objectives. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO), since November 1991, has been 
engaged in the so-called Doha Development Round, including debates over 
the terms of access to medicine—the relation of patents to public health and 
traditional knowledge. And since September 2007, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) has been implementing the Development 
Agenda, originally proposed by Argentina and Brazil and pushed through at 
the behest of developing countries.19 As a United Nations (U.N.) agency 
since 1967, WIPO is presumably committed to the various Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) adopted by the U.N. in September 2000 (they 
range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015) as “a 
blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading 
development institutions.”20 The MDG align, of course, with human rights 
norms such as the Right to Development.21 
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In the midst of this major move towards global development, intellectual 
property is driven by what I have described as a divide. This divide is 
written into the very structure of the WTO, as expressed by certain 
countries of the Global South, who insist on actual stated objectives and 
principles of this treaty which reference development goals other than 
purely economic ones.22 For example, Article 8 of the WTO’s Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (entitled 
“Principles”) refers to member states’ ability to “adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological 
development.”23 This explicit reference to “public interest” had never been 
articulated in an intellectual property multilateral framework prior to 
TRIPS. And this Article 8 language of “public health” was used by 
developing countries and their NGO allies to argue in favor of creative 
regulatory solutions to provide access to patented antiretroviral drugs during 
what continues to be the largest public health pandemic—the AIDS crisis—
which has already killed more than twenty-five million people, most of 
them in very poor countries.24 
Extrapolating from this compelling example of access to medicine, which 
is clearly a public health objective, I have argued elsewhere that a link 
between intellectual property and equality is a model focused on 
development conceptualized as freedom.25 Derived from Amartya Sen’s 
now famously entitled 1991 book Development as Freedom,26 this approach 
is a powerful vehicle to incorporate equality norms into the regulation of 
knowledge goods because it focuses on human capabilities to achieve 
certain objectives such as education, health, and other basic development 
goals essential to human flourishing. Both intellectual property and 
development are mostly faith-based (rather than evidence-based) endeavors, 
and their relation to each other is framed in terms of correlation rather than 
causation.27 Nonetheless, we have enough information to make some 
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judgments about what to do and what not to do about intellectual property 
as it relates to emerging development norms implicating equality.  
 
As it is presently structured, the main thrust of intellectual property law 
assumes that economic growth is the principal and only valid means to 
development. But growth per se without access to the social welfare 
dividends can tear away at the ensuing pie of greater overall wealth. 
Knowledge has value for many purposes, and so we need to pay attention to 
how it is distributed throughout society for those various uses. Knowledge 
has a strong public goods, or common pool resources, or non-market goods, 
or public domain, or commons aspect. (The various terms addressing this 
alternative space to private market mechanisms are definitionally fuzzy and 
overlapping, so I will refer to them all here as “public goods”—to be 
contrasted with “private goods.”).  
This public goods aspect was at least implicitly recognized by the English 
Parliament when it gave the title to the Statute of Anne: “An Act of the 
Encouragement of Learning . . .,” and it was again implicitly recognized by 
the House of Lords when it held in the 1774 case of Donaldson v. Beckett 
that the Statute of Anne superseded any common law right (or natural right) 
of the author to the printing, publishing, and vending of his or her work.28 
And Thomas Jefferson recognized this public goods aspect when he wrote: 
“He who receives an idea from me receives [it] without lessening [me], as 
he who lights his [candle] at mine receives light without darkening me.”29 
III. EQUALITY OF KNOWLEDGE GOODS 
Is social welfare through knowledge diffusion, whether global or 
domestic, maximized more by via private or public means, or some 
desirable mix of both?30 Exclusive rights through intellectual property may 
overstate the benefits of private investment incentives and underestimate 
social costs. Many policymakers involved in knowledge governance, 
 Intellectual Property Equality 265 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
including through intellectual property, fail to appreciate the full 
implications of distributional justice in this realm.  
As stated earlier, knowledge goods are public goods. I cannot prevent 
you from reading a book, once I am done with it. Often the policy 
conclusion drawn from this observation is that these goods then must be 
privatized, for there is no way to prevent others from reaping this “free” 
benefit from the good—or “free-riding” in economic parlance. However, 
that is not an inevitable policy choice—again, in economic jargon, these 
kinds of knowledge goods have positive spillover effects:31 if I read 
something, it benefits not only me but also you and others through my 
increased capacity to help people other than myself.  
Some may remember the “Free Mickey” buttons circulating when Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, the case involving the constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, was being argued before the Supreme Court in 2002.32 
Those buttons were a reference to Mickey Mouse, who was going to be 
locked up for another twenty years—for a total of ninety-five years from the 
date that his copyright was originally secured.33 The Free Mickey website 
states that “ironically, many of Disney’s animated films are based on 
nineteenth-century public domain works, including Snow White and the 
Seven Dwarfs, Cinderella, Pinocchio, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Alice 
in Wonderland, and The Jungle Book (released exactly one year after 
Kipling’s copyrights expired).”34 Disney’s ability to access and build upon 
these earlier works is a type of freedom of development that relates directly 
to copyright’s goal of encouraging learning, so as to address inequality of 
access to knowledge. Ponder the consequences of the current ninety-five 
year term in the 1976 Act, compared to the original fourteen, twenty-one, or 
twenty-eight-year terms of protection in the Statute of Anne. 
Knowledge goods contribute to public policy goals other than innovation, 
and creativity. If I read something, I may not only create something from 
my knowledge (such as this article), I might also be happier in general (to 
which Thomas Jefferson aspired for us all),35 and so may my family, 
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friends, and community, especially if I am a woman. This is positive from a 
pure economic growth perspective as well as a distributional justice 
perspective. Why? Well, here is what we do know—despite the lack of 
evidence generally about intellectual property for optimal development—
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and 
even Goldman Sachs36 agree that gender equality is critical in combating 
global poverty. Women’s empowerment raises economic productivity, 
reduces infant mortality, improves health and nutrition, and improves 
household welfare through multiple channels, such as through higher wages 
and better jobs, lower fertility, lower maternal mortality, entrepreneurial 
success, intergenerational benefits, and greater female employment rates.37 
There is a growth premium from gender equality in education, and lots of 
data to support this. 
And if I read something, I may be healthier, happier, and thus, contribute 
to the decrease of public “bads”—which have negative spillovers such as 
communicable disease—as well as the increase of other global public goods 
that are high on the list of the MDG (and desirable for all countries to 
achieve).38 These public goods include equality. Among other things, we 
know that there is a strong correlation between income inequality and 
educational inequality.39 
Intellectual property professors are fond of pointing out that knowledge 
goods are inputs to the production of other public goods. This is a point 
about intergenerational distribution as well. The term “sustainability” is 
kind of overused these days, but this is a critical point about intellectual 
property: knowledge is needed to create more knowledge. Overcontrol of 
knowledge is like a tax on creating and consuming by others who do not 
have access. Some of the early printing patents prior to the Statute of Anne 
were on ABC readers.40 These were very lucrative copyrights for the 
printers, but think about the impact of these perpetual exclusive rights on 
the ability of people to learn how to read and, ultimately, upon general 
social welfare. As Sir Isaac Newton said in 1676 (who himself was 
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paraphrasing Bernard de Chartres in 1159 with respect to scientific 
knowledge), “If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of 
giants.”41 It is hard to stand on “sholders,” or even shoulders, if one does 
not have the benefit of access to the giants of the past at all, due to 
illiteracy. 
In the equality space, critical legal scholars have articulated their dual 
consciousness regarding law’s potential for achieving justice, as well as its 
use as a tool for oppression.42 In a slightly different vein, however, we 
require multiple vocabularies to convey the pluralities in which many of us 
now live.43 Rather than the myopic focus on intellectual property’s capacity 
to encourage innovation or creativity, is there another way to speak in 
intellectual property? Can we broaden its focus to include the production of 
other global public goods such as equality, education, health, food security, 
climate change and other areas deeply implicated in a “development as 
freedom” model, where human capacity for flourishing requires basic 
freedoms such as the ability to read, to eat, to be free from disease, and so 
on? These freedoms are the prerequisites of a functioning knowledge 
society that formal intellectual property regimes already assume. 
Some of the tools I have used to articulate intellectual property equality 
come from critical theory, which has a rich vocabulary for exploring 
equality norms, such as “looking from below,”44 simultaneity45 or 
intersectionality,46 and interest convergence.47 At around the same time that 
U.S. law professors were mapping out a new approach to law called 
“critical race theory,” development economists at the UNDP were 
articulating the human capabilities paradigm of development.48 What strikes 
me is not how different these parallel approaches are but how similar they 
are. Critical race feminists’ insights about women of color 
disproportionately experiencing violence that is invisible to others echoes 
Amartya Sen’s claim in the New York Review of Books from around the 
same time period that globally “100 Million Women are Missing” due to a 
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lack of health care and attention, correlated with a lack of gainful 
employment and education.49 
This asymmetry persists today. What if we took seriously in intellectual 
property an equality analysis on a global level that focused on these missing 
women, their lower literacy rates, their higher mortality rates, their lower 
employment rates, and other forms of structural, representational, and 
political violence that they experience?  What intellectual property policies 
contribute to these missing women, and how would we want to restructure 
our intellectual property laws, both internationally and locally, to address 
this type of structural violence?   
For example, experienced observers have noted that the diffusion of 
health technologies depends more on the absorption of knowledge on the 
part of agents, and less on the embodiment of new technologies, especially 
at low levels of development.50 Additionally, overwhelming evidence points 
to the importance of a mother’s education in determining infant and child 
mortality.51 Thus, in regard to the MDG, paradoxically, copyright policy 
may lead more directly to better health measures than patent policy, 
especially at lower levels of development, because changes in educational 
access affected by copyright laws may also affect maternal and child health 
more than the health technologies incentivized by patent laws. Yet, the 
disproportionate focus in the global health debates has been on technical 
fixes, such as access to medicines (pills and vaccines) rather than on access 
to education. 
Another less gender-specific example is that, as observed earlier, the 
fundamental human right of free speech undergirds the copyright regime.52 
However, free expression norms are not being exported at the same rate as 
the economic norms of copyright holders to other countries through 
multilateral and bilateral treaties.53 Taking just one of the tools and insights 
of critical theory, a focus on basic education or freedom of expression in 
development would result in very different norm-setting environments for 
copyright—an approach “From Below.”54 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Just as the Statute of Anne emerged not long after the printing press, 
future forms of knowledge production and governance will emerge with 
new technologies. Students in my Intellectual Property and Development 
Seminar this semester are debating, for example, how education can be 
fostered through open licensing of content created through digital-
networked technologies. In countries like South Africa, where there are 
eleven official languages and an average of one textbook for every five 
students55—and in the United States, for that matter, where we are facing 
declining educational budgets in the face of economic stress—we need 
creative approaches and open minds to copyright.56 Borrowing from the 
past, the Statute of Anne provided public access through libraries.57 It also 
contained a civil action for unfair pricing,58 demonstrating that access to 
affordable knowledge was a concern even three hundred years ago when 
this first major statute was enacted. What are the twentieth century 
equivalents of these provisions analogous to those  in Google Books 
Settlement,59 for example? 
Intellectual property and equality are fundamentally intertwined in these 
governance challenges and endeavors as we adapt to new technologies for 
disseminating knowledge, some mechanisms of which we can learn from 
giants before us, and some of which we must dare to imagine, standing on 
their “sholders.”  
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